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FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4645

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 5 KINSHASA 6664

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, CG

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF US SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR ZAIRE
FOR FY 1979

REF: STATE 133136

1. ALL REFERENCES ARE TO STATE 133136.

2. PARA 3: THE US INTERESTS TO BE SERVED BY MAINTAINING A
SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH ZAIRE ARE:

A. MAINTENANCE OF ZAIRE'S UNITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY,
EROSION OF WHICH COULD GREATLY AGGRAVATE INSTABILITY IN CENTRAL
AFRICA AND ADVERSELY AFFECT US INTERESTS IN THE AREA.

B. RETENTION AND STRENGTHENING OF ZAIRE'S CAPACITY TO PLAY
AN INFLUENTIAL, MODERATE ROLE IN REGIONAL AND GOLBAL CONTEXTS,
INCLUDING SOUTHERN AFRICA.

C. CONTINUED US INFLUENCE AMONG PRESENT AND POTENTIAL ZAIRIAN
LEADERS, MANY OF WHOM INEVITABLY ARE DRAWN FROM MILITARY ESTABLISH-
LMENT.

D. CONTINUED ACCESS TO ZAIRE'S VAST NATURAL RESOURCES BY US
AND OTHER WESTERN NATIONS.

E. MAINTENANCE OF US OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO
RELATIVELY WELL-DEVELOPED AIRFIELDS AND PORT FACILTILITIES.

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3. PARA 4 A: ZAIRIAN DEFENSE OFFICIALS DEFINE A TWO-FOLD
THREAT TO ZAIRE: THEY CONTINUE TO PERCEIVE A SOVIET DESIGN
TO GAIN A POSITION OF CONTROL AND INFLUENCE IN CENTRAL AFRICA,
TO THE DETRIMENT OF WESTERN-ORIENTED AND POLITICALLY MODERATE
AFRICAN NATIONS; AND, THEY SEE A MORE IMMEDIATE THREAT FROM
THOSE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES ESPOUSING RADICAL SOCILISM AND

PROCLAIMING GOALS INCOMPATIBLE WITH ZAIRE'S PERCEPTION OF THE DESIRE EVOLUTION OF CENTRAL AFRICA. AMONG THESE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, ZAIRE NOW SEES ANGOLA AS THE MOST DANGEROUS. THE PRESENCE OF A MARXIST REGIME IN ANGOLA, BOLSTERED BY A SIZABLE ARSENAL OF SOVIET-SUPPLIED WEAPONS AND THE CONTINUING PRESENCE OF CUBAN FORCES, IS SEEN AS A DIRECT THREAT TO ZAIRE'S SECURITY. THE SHABA INVASION IS VIEWED AS CLEAR EVIDENCE OF ANGOLA'S HOSTILE INTENTIONS TOWARD ZAIRE. ALTHOUGH THE ATTACK WAS UNSUCCESSFUL, THE EX-KATANGAN INVADERS WITHDREW ESSENTIALLY INTACT AND RETAIN THE CAPABILITY OF TRYING AGAIN TO OCCUPY THE MINERAL-RICH SHABA REGION AND THEREBY OVERTHROW THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.

4. ON A LESSER SCALE, THE MARXIST ORIENTATION OF NEIGHBORING CONGO AND THE PRESENCE THERE ALSO OF CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL ARE VIEWED AS A POTENTIAL THREAT. AND ADDED SOURCE OF CONCERN IS THE FACT THAT ANGOLA AND CONGO, BY VIRTUE OF THEIR GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION ASTRIDE ZAIRE'S NARROW ACCESS TO THE SEA, ARE IN A POSITION TO INTERRUPT ZAIRE'S MAJOR TRADE ROUTE. IN THE EAST, THE MAIN THREAT IS SEEN AS COMING FROM UGANDA, WITH ITS ERRATIC LEADERSHIP AND RELATIVELY DEVELOPED MILITARY (PARTICULARLY AIR) CAPABILITY. BURUNDI AND TANZANIA ARE ALSO REGARDED WITH SOME SUSPICION DUE TO THEIR "PROGRESSIVE" POLITICAL ORIENTATION AND THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET AND ASIAN COMMUNIST ARMS AND ADVISERS. TANZANIA IS SEEN AS A SOURCE OF POTENTIAL SUPPORT FOR THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY (PRP), A BAND OF MARXIST-ORIENTED ARMED
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REBELS IN EASTERN ZAIRE WHOSE AVOWED OBJECTIVE IS TO OVERTHROW THE KINSHASA REGIME.

5. ZAIRE'S STRATEGIES TO MEET THESE PERCEIVED THREATS ARE BASED IN THE FIRST INSTANCE ON THE ACQUISITION AND MAINTENANCE OF AN ADEQUATE MILITARY DEFENSE STRUCTURE. DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL MEANS ARE USED CONCURRENTLY TO MAINTAIN AND STRENGTHEN BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH ZAIRE'S IMMEDIATE NEIGHBORS. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE GOZ'S EFFORTS TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH ANGOLA HAVE NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL. ON A BROADER SCALE, ZAIRE HAS ACTIVELY SOUGHT THROUGH DIPLOMATIC MEANS TO MUSTER THE WIDEST POSSIBLE POLITICAL, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT FROM OTHER SO-CALLED MODERATE GOVERNMENTS; THE WIDESPREAD, SYMPATHETIC RESPONSE TO APPEALS FOR HELP DURING THE SHABA ATTACK IS EVIDENCE OF THE GOZ'S SUCCESS IN THIS REGARD.

6. THE MISSION SHARES ZAIRE'S PERCEPTION OF ANGOLA AS THE MOST SERIOUS POTENTIAL DANGER. GEOGRAPHY PROVIDES EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR HOSTILE FORCES OPERATING FROM ANGOLA TO INFLICT SERIOUS DAMAGE ON ZAIRE. THE CLOSURE OF THE BENGUELA RAILROAD, LINKING SHABA WITH ANGOLA'S PORTS, HAS ALREADY PLACED A HEAVY BURDEN ON THE COPPERBELT'S TWO REMAINING LINKS WITH THE OUTSIDE

WORLD--THE MAJOR PORT OF MATADI AND THE RAILROAD THROUGH ZAMBIA. MOREOVER, ZAIRE'S COASTLINE EXTENDS ONLY THIRTY-SEVEN KILOMETERS AND IS GIRDED BY ANGOLAN TERRITORY. THE COUNTRY'S TWO MAJOR PORTS LIE 90 AND 137 KILOMETERS INLAND, RESPECTIVELY, ON THE ZAIRE RIVER. FOR MOST OF THAT DISTANCE, ANGOLA CONTROLS THE SOUTH BANK AND THE MAIN CHANNEL AND COULD EASILY CLOSE THE RIVER TO ZAIRIAN TRAFFIC. ADDITIONALLY, CRITICAL SECTORS OF ZAIRE'S INTERNAL TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM AND KEY INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES, SUCH AS THE COPPER MINES IN SHABA, ARE WITHIN EASY STRIKING DISTANCE FOR BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL FORCES ORIGINATING FROM ANGOLA. WE AGREE WITH THE GOZ THAT THE RECENT NEAR SUCCESS OF THE ANGOLAN-BASED INVASION OF THE SHABA REGION UNDERSCORES THE POTENTIAL FOR SUCH ACTIVITY BY OTHER HOSTILE GROUPS.

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7. DESPITE THE CONTINUED CUBAN/SOVIET PRESENCE IN ANGOLA, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE MPLA REGIME IS NOW IN A POSITION TO MOUNT A DIRECT, SUSTAINED MILITARY EFFORT AGAINST ZAIRE, BELEAGUERED AS THE REGIME IS BY ARMED OPPOSITION FROM UNITA, FNLA, AND FLEC, AND BY INTERNAL POLITICAL DISSENSION. LUANDA COULD NEVERTHELESS INTRODUCE IRREGULAR FORCES INTO ZAIRE CAPABLE OF INTERDICTING ITS LINKS TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD AND OTHERWISE HARRASSING ITS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. INDEED, THERE ARE INDICATIONS FROM INTELLIGENCE SOURCES THAT ANGOLA MAY BE ASSISTING THE EX-KATANGAN GENDARMES

TO UNDERTAKE GUERRILLA OPERATIONS IN SHABA.

8. ADDITIONALLY, ZAIRE CANNOT AFFORD TO IGNORE ZAMBIA, SINCE MUCH OF THE ECONOMIC LIFE OF THE IMPORTANT SHABA REGION DEPENDS ON CONTINUED ACCESS TO ZAMBIA FOR SUPPLIES AND TRANSPORTATION LINKS. WHILE THE MISSION SEES LITTLE MILITARY THREAT FROM ZAMBIA ITSELF AS LONG AS PRESIDENT KAUNDA REMAINS IN OFFICE, THERE IS A DEFINITE DANGER THAT HOSTILITIES IN ZIMBABWE COULD SERVE TO CUT OFF VITAL SOURCES OF SUPPLY AND TRADE ROUTES BETWEEN SHABA AND SOUTHERN AFRICA. THE MISSION RECOGNIZES THE POTENTIAL THREAT FROM UGANDA AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, BUT AT THE PRESENT TIME NEITHER POSSESSES THE CAPABILITY TO MOUNT MORE THAN A LIMITED CROSS-BORDER PENETRATION OR A ONE-TIME STRIKE AT AN ECONOMIC PRESSURE POINT. WE DO NOT SEE A THREAT AT PRESENT FROM ANY OTHER NEIGHBOR, EXCEPT FOR TANZANIA'S DEMONSTRATED
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ABILITY TO FURNISH ASSISTANCE AND SAFEHAVEN TO ZAIRIAN REBELS
(PRP) OPERATING IN ZAIRE

9. ZAIRE'S LONG-TERM SECURITY, BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL, WILL DEPEND IN LARGE MEASURE ON THE ABILITY OF THE NATION TO ACHIEVE ECONOMIC PROGRESS FOR ITS PEOPLE. BUT TO ACHIEVE ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND PROGRESS, ZAIRE MUST AT THE SAME TIME BE ABLE TO PROTECT ITS RESOURCES, INFRASTRUCTURE AND INDUSTRIAL PLANT. A BALANCE NEEDS TO BE MAINTAINED BETWEEN SUFFICIENT MILITARY CAPABILITY TO ASSURE DOMESTIC ORDER AND SECURITY FROM AGGRESSION, AND YET NOT SO MUCH AS TO DIVERT ALREADY INSUFFICIENT NATIONAL RESOURCES FROM THE LONG-TERM GOAL OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS. GIVEN THE NATION'S DEMONSTRATED TENDENCY TOWARD ADMINISTRATIVE DISORDER AND SECTIONALISM, STRONG CENTRAL AUTHORITY IS A VITAL INGREDIENT TO ANY NATIONAL PROGRESS. THE USG SHOULD SEEK TO IDENTIFY AND ENCOURAGE WAYS BY WHICH THE MILITARY OF ZAIRE CAN NOT ONLY PROVIDE FOR THE NATION'S DEFENSE BUT AT THE SAME TIME CONTRIBUTE TO ITS GROWTH.

10. PARA 4 B.: AS ALREADY STATED IN 4 A., WE AGREE WITH THE GOZ THAT AN EXTERNAL THREAT, PRIMARILY FROM ANGOLA, EXISTS AND IS LIKELY TO PERSIST FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. AS NOTED IN PARA 4 A., ZAMBIA COULD ALSO PRESENT A THREAT IF THE LEADERSHIP WERE TO CHANGE. ZAMBIA'S POWERFUL ECONOMIC LEVERAGE IN TERMS OF FOODSTUFFS, FUEL AND TRANSPORTATION LINKS COULD BE BROUGHT TO BEAR QUITE EASILY. ZAIRE'S INTERNAL TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM IS SIMPLY NOT ADEQUATE TO SUPPORT THE ECONOMIC LIFE OF THE COUNTRY (AND MORE PARTICULARLY SHABA) WITHOUT THE CONTINUED COOPERATION OF ZAMBIA AND CERTAIN OTHER NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES.

11. PARA 4 C.: THE SHABA INVASION DEMONSTRATED CLEARLY TO GOZ MILITARY PLANNERS THAT FAZ WAS ILL-TRAINED, POORLY STRUCTURED AND TOO NUMEROUS TO MAINTAIN PROPERLY OR TO SUPPORT ADEQUATELY.

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THEREFORE A TWO YEAR REORGANIZATION PROGRAM IS CURRENTLY UNDER STUDY (FOR DETAILS SEE KINSHASA 4854, 5223, 5791). THE COSTLY INTRODUCTION OF RELATIVELY SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT IS NOT ANTICIPATED. PRESENT PLANS FOR REORGANIZATION CALL FOR REDUCTION OF THE TOTAL FORCE AND CREATION OF LIGHT INFANTRY UNITS, EQUIPPED TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE WITH ASSETS AVAILABLE IN-COUNTRY. EMPHASIS IS ALSO TO BE PLACED ON TRAINING.

12. IN RECOGNITION OF URGENT NEED FOR MORE AND BETTER TRAINING, THE GOZ HAS REQUESTED INCREASES IN BOTH FRENCH AND BELGIAN ADVISORY/TRAINING PERSONNEL AT ALL LEVELS. INDICATIONS ARE THAT THOSE GOVERNMENTS WILL RESPOND POSITIVELY. THE GOZ'S MID-RANGE REORGANIZATION PLANS, WITH THE DE-EMPHASIS OF SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT ACQUISITIONS, PLACE THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT WITHIN MORE REALISTIC PARAMETERS. US INTERESTS WOULD DEFINITELY BE SERVED BY CONTINUING TO SUPPORT THE REORGANIZED FORCE IN OUR TRADITIONAL AREAS OF COMMUNICATIONS, TRAINING, TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS.

13. IT IS UNCLEAR AT THIS TIME WHAT THE LONG-RANGE MILITARY STRUCTURE WILL BE. HOWEVER, INDICATIONS ARE THAT ZAIRE'S MILITARY PLANNERS CONTINUE TO VIEW THE US-SUPPLIED GROUND FORCE UPGRADE PACKAGE AS WELL SUITED TO GOZ'S LEGITIMATE SECURITY NEEDS. AT PRESENT, THEY ARE FOCUSING ON THE TWO-YEAR REORGANIZATION PROGRAM. ONCE THAT HAS BECOME OPERATIONAL, A JOINT REVIEW OF THE MILITARY SITUATION WOULD BE NECESSARY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT MODIFICATIONS MADE IN THE MILITARY STRUCTURE AND OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE LEGITIMATE NEEDS OF FAZ AT THAT TIME.

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14. PARA 4 D.: SPECIFIC PRIORITY LISTS OF DEFENSE ARTICLES ARE DIFFICULT TO ESTABLISH AT THE PRESENT TIME. MUCH WILL DEPEND ON THE PACING OF THE FAZ TWO-YEAR REORGANIZATION PLAN AND THE ATTAINMENT OF A REASONABLE DEGREE OF COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS WITHIN THAT TIMEFRAME, WHICH IN TURN DEPENDS IN LARGE DEGREE ON THE EXTENT OF BELGIAN/FRENCH TRAINING AND ADVISORY ASSISTANCE PROVIDED.

15. IN ALL LIKELIHOOD THE US WILL BE ASKED IN FY 1979 TO CONTINUE, UNDER FMS FINANCING, THE SUPPLY AND FOLLOW-ON SUPPORT FOR TRADITIONAL ITEMS: TRANSPORTATION ITEMS (E.G., TRUCKS JEEPS.), TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS, AND SPARE PARTS FOR SWIFT BOATS AND C-130 AND CESSNA AIRCRAFT. ADDITIONAL FAZ INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS WITHIN SPECIFIED GUIDELINES MAY ALSO BE REQUESTED. PROVISION OF ITEMS IN THESE AREAS WOULD SERVE US INTERESTS INsofar AS THEY RELATE TO US-SUPPLIED ARTICLES FOR WHICH PARTS CAN ONLY BE OBTAINED FROM US. FAILURE TO MEET GOZ REQUIREMENTS IN THESE AREAS WOULD HAVE A DAMAGING EFFECT ON US/ZAIRIAN RELATIONS AS THE GOZ WOULD PERCEIVE SUCH AN ATTITUDE AS AN UNWILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT THE REORGANIZATION EFFORTS WE OURSELVES HAVE FAVORED AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CREDIBLE DETERRENT AGAINST INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREATS.

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16. THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT A MODIFIED (AS A RESULT OF SHABA LESSONS LEARNED) GROUND FORCE UPGRADE PACKAGE MAY BE REQUESTED AS EARLY AS FY 79, ASSUMING SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF REORGANIZATION PLANS. HOWEVER, NO REQUESTS FOR SOPHISTICATED ITEMS SUCH AS TANKS, JET AIRCRAFT, RADAR OR AA WEAPONS ARE CURRENTLY ANTICIPATED.

17. ZAIRE DOES WISH TO CONTINUE UNDER IMETP PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION IN CONUS OF JUNIOR AND MIDDLE LEVEL OFFICERS (BASIC AND ADVANCED OFFICER COURSES AND STAFF COLLEGES) AND SPECIALIZED TRAINING NOT AVAILABLE IN-COUNTRY (BASIC PILOT, NAVIGATOR AND CREW TRAINING FOR C-130 AIRCRAFT) AND IN-COUNTRY TRAINING USING THE MTT CONCEPT ON AN AS-REQUIRED BASIS.

18. PARA 4 E.: ZAIRE'S DEBT SERVICE PROBLEMS ARE ALMOST OVERWHELMING BUT OBLIGATIONS ON FMS LOANS ARE NOT NOW A LARGE PART OF THE PROBLEM. BARRING FURTHER DEBT RESCHEDULING, WE EXPECT PAYMENTS AGAINST FMS LOANS IN 1978 TO TOTAL ABOUT \$17.2 MILLION, WHICH REPRESENTS 3 1/2 PERCENT OF ALL DEBT SERVICE REQUIREMENTS

AND ONE PERCENT OF PROJECTED EXPORT EARNINGS THAT YEAR. IF THE FMS PROGRAM CONTINUES AT THE RATE OF \$30 MILLION/ YEAR THROUGH FY 79, THE DEBT SERVICE BURDEN OF FMS WILL GROW TO ABOUT \$49.4 MILLION BY 1982, WHEN IT WILL ACCOUNT FOR FROM 7 PERCENT TO 15 PERCENT OF TOTAL DEBT SERVICE AND FROM 1.5 PERCENT TO 3 PERCENT OF EXPORT EARNINGS.

19. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE FMS PROGRAM ENVISIONED FOR FY 79 WOULD HAVE ANY ADVERSE EFFECT ON EFFORTS BEING UNDERTAKEN BY VARIOUS GOVERNMENTS, PRIVATE BANKS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO ASSIST ZAIRE ECONOMICALLY. AFTER THE SCARE OF THE SHABA INVASION, IT IS LIKELY THAT AT LEAST MODERATE FMS ASSISTANCE WOULD REASSURE ZAIRE'S ECONOMIC PARTNERS.

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20. THE OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE EXPENDITURES ASSOCIATED WITH THE PROPOSED FY 79 PROGRAM ARE MODEST COMPARED WITH THOSE THAT COULD BE EXPECTED IF SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT OR WEAPONS WERE INTRODUCED. WE BELIEVE THE GOZ HAS THE FINANCIAL AND MANAGERIAL CAPABILITIES TO MAINTAIN THE FY 79 PROGRAM. AT PRESENT THE GOZ SPENDS LESS THAN 15 PERCENT OF ITS BUDGET ON DEFENSE, INCLUDING DEBT SERVICE ON MILITARY HARDWARE. WHILE THE GOZ IS NOT DOING ENOUGH TO STIMULATE AGRICULTURE OR MEET PRESSING SOCIAL NEEDS, DEFENSE SPENDING IS NOT THE CULPRIT, AS THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ON THE 1977 BUDGET SHOW: (N.B. BUDGET FIGURES ARE NOT PUBLIC AND WERE RECEIVED FROM CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE. PLEASE HANDLE ACCORDINGLY.)

DEFENSE (INCLUDING DEBT SERVICE)	113 MILLION ZAIRES
EDUCATION (EXCLUDING DEBT SERVICE)	126 MILLION ZAIRES
HEALTH (EXCLUDING DEBT SERVICE)	44 MILLION ZAIRES
AGRICULTURE (EXCLUDING DEBT SERVICE)	19 MILLION ZAIRES
ALL OTHER SECTORS (EXCLUDING DEBT SERVICE)	532 MILLION ZAIRES
TOTAL BUDGET	834 MILLION ZAIRES

THE FY 79 PROGRAM REQUIRES NO FOLLOW-ON. THUS, THERE IS NO QUESTION OF "LOCKING IN" EITHER OURSELVES OR THE GOZ TO A LONG-TERM RESOURCES COMMITMENT AS LONG AS THE UPGRADE PACKAGE IS POSTPONED UNTIL 1980. WE WOULD, OF COURSE, WANT TO CONTINUE MONITORING CLOSELY OUR FMS LEVELS WITH A VIEW TO MAKING ADJUSTMENTS SHOULD IT APPEAR THAT THEY ARE CREATING TOO MUCH OF A FINANCIAL BURDEN.

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21. SECURITY ASSISTANCE COULD HAVE GENUINE ECONOMIC BENEFITS AS WELL AS COSTS. IN ZAIRE, SECURITY AND POLITICAL STABILITY ARE PREREQUISITES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND PROGRESS. WITHOUT SECURITY OF PERSON AND PROPERTY, EFFORTS TO STIMULATE ECONOMIC RECOVERY WILL BE DOOMED. FURTHERMORE, THE FMS MATERIALS ENVISIONED FOR FY 79 (E.G., GROUND AND AIR TRANSPORTATION) ARE CONVERTIBLE TO DIRECT USE IN SUPPORT OF THE CIVILIAN ECONOMY AS REQUIRED.

22. PARA 4 F.: THE ZAIRIAN AIR FORCE (FAZA) PRESENTLY HAS SIX (6) C-130 LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT. LONG-RANGE GOZ PLANS CALL FOR FURTHER ACQUISITIONS UP TO A TOTAL OF TWELVE C-130S. TO DATE SIX US CIVILIAN LOCKHEED CONTRACT PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO ASSIST FAZA IN MAINTAINING THESE AIRCRAFT AND TO PROVIDE NECESSARY TECHNICAL SUPPORT. NO INCREASE IN LOCKHEED CONTRACT PERSONNEL IS ANTICIPATED IN FY 79. NOR ARE ADDITIONAL CONTRACT PERSONNEL LIKELY TO BE REQUIRED FOR THE TYPES OF NON-SOPHISTICATED MILITARY EQUIPMENT WE FORESEE BEING ACQUIRED WITH FY 79 FMS CREDITS.

23. PARA 4 G.: ALL ANTICIPATED FY 79 DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES ARE AVAILABLE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES. HOWEVER, MONETARY CREDITS FROM THESE COUNTRIES ARE LIMITED. EQUIPMENT CURRENTLY IN THE POSSESSION OF THE GOZ IS LARGELY A MIXTURE OF US, FRENCH, BELGIAN, ISRAELI, PRC AND NORTH KOREAN MANUFACTURE. DENIAL OF
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TRADITIONAL REQUESTS FOR US EQUIPMENT AND SPARE PARTS COMPATIBLE WITH EXISTING FAZ INVENTORY WOULD POSE SERIOUS POLITICAL AS WELL AS PRACTICAL MILITARY COMPLICATIONS TO THE EXTENT THAT GOZ EXPECTS AND RELIES ON USG SUPPORT. SPECIFICALLY, SUCH A DENIAL WOULD UNDERMINE FAZ REORGANIZATION EFFORTS. IN VIEW OF ZAIRE'S

CURRENT ECONOMIC BURDENS IT APPEARS UNLIKELY THAT GOZ WOULD BE ABLE TO BUY SIGNIFICANT NEW EQUIPMENT INVENTORIES FROM OTHER SOURCES IF USG WERE TO DENY SUCH REQUESTS.

24. AS FOR DEFENSE SERVICES, IN-COUNTRY TRAINING OF FAZ WILL CONTINUE TO BE CONDUCTED LARGELY BY FRENCH AND BELGIAN PERSONNEL. USG EFFORTS ARE CONCENTRATED MAINLY IN OFF-SHORE FORMAL PROFESSIONAL SCHOOL TRAINING. MTTTS HAVE BEEN PROVIDED FOR REQUIRED IN-COUNTRY TRAINING AND WE MAY EXPECT TO CONTINUE THIS PROGRAM ON A LIMITED BASIS. CLOSE COORDINATION OF TRAINING EFFORTS EXISTS AMONG THE THREE MILITARY MISSIONS IN ZAIRE.

25. PARA 4 H.: NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, NOTABLY ANGOLA, HAVE ARMORED FORCES EQUIPPED WITH TANKS OF A TYPE PRESENTLY IN USE BY WARSAW PACT STATES. THEY HAVE SOME MODERN JET STRIKE AIRCRAFT AND POSSESS LIMITED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS INCLUDING SOME MISSILES. IN ADDITION, THESE NEIGHBORS HAVE THE BENEFIT OF ON-GOING TRAINING PROGRAMS CONDUCTED BY SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS IN THE FORM OF IN-COUNTRY ADVISERS AS WELL AS OVERSEAS TRAINING FOR SELECTED CADRE. THUS, ZAIRE'S MILITARY NEEDS, AS VIEWED FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF MAINTAINING A ROUGH PARITY WITH NEIGHBORING STATES, WOULD INCLUDE MORE TRAINING (INDIVIDUAL AND UNIT), LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT, AND EQUIPMENT TO PROVIDE AN ANTI-AIR CAPABILITY, AND ANTI-TANK CAPABILITY, LAND AND AIR TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS. TO THE EXTENT THAT US EFFORTS ARE CONCENTRATED IN THE AREAS OF TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATIONS, TRAINING AND INFRASTRUCTURE, THERE SHOULD BE NO ARMS CONTROL IMPACT RESULTING FROM ANTICIPATED US SALES OR TRANSFERS.

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26. WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE GOZ REQUESTS FOR RELATIVELY MORE SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT TO MEET ITS DEFENSE NEEDS. HOWEVER, IF SUCH EQUIPMENT WERE REQUESTED OR PROVIDED BY THE US OR ANOTHER SUPPLIER, IT WOULD HAVE MINIMAL IMPACT AS IT WOULD BE RESPONDING TO THE PRESENCE OF SIMILAR EQUIPMENT ALREADY IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES.

27. PARA 4 I.: THERE HAVE BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN ZAIRE DURING THE PAST YEAR. THE SHABA INVASION, WHILE PRECIPITATING A NUMBER OF DETENTIONS OF POTENTIAL OPPOSITION MEMBERS, DID NOT RESULT IN ANY SERIOUS EROSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AS NOW PRACTICED IN ZAIRE. MANY OF THOSE ARRESTED WERE HELD ONLY FOR SHORT PERIODS THEN RELEASED; DATA OBTAINED TEND TO SUBSTANTIATE THE VIEW THAT TORTURE IS NEITHER ROUTINE NOR A MATTER OF GOVERNMENT POLICY. IN HIS JULY 1 SPEECH ANNOUNCING MAJOR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY REFORMS IN THE WAKE OF SHABA, MOBUTU SPECIFICALLY PROMISED TO TAKE STEPS TO IMPROVE HUMAN RIGHTS BY CURTAILING INJUSTICES COMMITTED AGAINST THE PEOPLE BY THE POLICE AND OTHER

SECURITY FORCES.

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28. IN GENERAL, SECURITY ASSISTANCE, AS WITH ALL FORMS OF BILATERAL ASSISTANCE, FACILITATES THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE USG CAN EXERCISE INFLUENCE IN THE AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS. A DIMINUTION OF ASSISTANCE COULD ENTAIL A CONCOMITANT DECREASE IN OUR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE ZAIRE TOWARD GREATER LIBERALIZATION OF ITS POLICIES. MOREOVER, AN EMPHASIS IN US MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN AREAS SUCH AS INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATIONS AND TRAINING CAN AID THE CAUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ZAIRE. SINCE MANY VIOLATIONS IN ZAIRE ARE DUE TO CAPRICIOUS ACTS OF POORLY PROVISIONED, BADLY TRAINED, UNDISCIPLINED SOLDIERS AND GENDARMES, AID THAT CONTRIBUTES TO A BETTER PROVISIONED AND DISCIPLINED FORCE WOULD TEND TO MAKE EXTORTION AND BRUTALITY BY THE INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER LESS LIKELY. THE MILITARY COULD THUS BE ENCOURAGED TO ACT AS PROTECTORS RATHER THAN VIOLATORS OF THE RIGHTS OF THE COMMON CITIZEN.

29. PARA 4 J.: ZAIRE IS PRIMARILY A PURCHASER OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT, FOR ITS OWN USE. WHILE FROM TIME TO TIME IT MIGHT TRANSFER EQUIPMENT TO NEIGHBORING FRIENDLY STATES, OR TO LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN ANGOLA OR SOUTHERN AFRICA, WHATEVER TRANSFERS THAT DO OCCUR INVOLVE VERY MODEST AMOUNTS. ZAIRE'S OWN DEFENSE NEEDS ARE SIMPLY TOO GREAT AND ITS MEANS FOR FILLING THEM TOO LIMITED TO PERMIT THE GOZ TO UNDERTAKE ARMS TRANSFERS TO OTHER COUNTRIES OF ANY SIGNIFICANCE. THERE IS NO
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EVIDENCE THAT ZAIRE HAS TRANSFERRED FMS EQUIPMENT TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS OR THAT IT WOULD NOT HONOR US RESTRICTIONS IN THIS REGARD.

30. EXTENT TO WHICH ZAIRE WOULD COOPERATE WITH US IN RESTRAINING ITS OWN ARMS ACQUISITIONS WOULD DEPEND IN LARGE MEASURE ON DEGREE TO WHICH NEIGHBORING, POTENTIALY HOSTILE STATES WOULD EXERCISE SIMILAR RESTRAINT. PUT ANOTHER WAY, ZAIRE WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO SUPPORT OUR EFFORTS WITHOUT ASSURANCE THAT THE SOVIETS AND THEIR FRIENDS WOULD COOPERATE AS WELL. IN THIS REGARD, THE GOZ HAS NOT BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE ANGOLAN EXPERIENCE. MOREOVER, THE GOZ BELIEVES THE SOVIETS HAVE ALREADY CHANGED THE BALANCE OF MILITARY POWER IN CENTRAL AFRICA IN FAVOR OF ANGOLA--AN IMBALANCE THAT GOZ BELIEVES SHOULD BE CORRECTED FOR THE SAKE OF ZAIRE'S OWN SECURITY. SO LONG AS THIS PERCEIVED IMBALANCE PERSISTS, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF ASSURANCES THAT ZAIRE'S NEIGHBORS AND THEIR ARMS SUPPLIERS ARE ALSO COOPERATING, THE GOZ WILL BE CAUTIOUS IN LENDING SUPPORT TO US EFFORTS TO CURTAIL ARMS TRANSFERS.

31. PARA 4 K.: THE IMET PROGRAM HAS BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE ORIENTED TOWARD PROFESSIONAL TRAINING, AND ACCORDINGLY USG AND GOZ IMET OBJECTIVES ARE IN CONSONANCE. TO DATE, EQUIPMENT-RELATED TRAINING HAS BEEN PURCHASED ON A LIMITED BASIS UNDER FMS. BECAUSE OF THE CURRENT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS PREMATURE TO REQUEST THAT THE GOZ PAY TRAVEL AND LIVING COSTS UNDER IMET. THE EMBASSY STRONGLY RECOMMENDS CONTINUANCE OF US IMETP IN FY 79 SIMILAR TO THAT OF PREVIOUS YEARS.

32. SUMMARY COMMENT: OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN ZAIRE HAS BEEN, AND CONTINUES TO BE, AN IMPORTANT AND EFFECTIVE ELEMENT IN PROMOTING US INTERESTS AND POLICT OBJECTIVES IN ZAIRE. IT SHOULD BE CONTINUED AT LEAST THROUGH FY 79, ALTHOUGH FUTURE
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LEVELS SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE CAREFULLY ASSESSED IN THE LIGHT OF THE DEGREE TO WHICH CURRENT INSTABILITY IN CENTRAL/SOUTHERN AFRICA PERSISTS, ZAIRE'S GENUINE DEFENSE NEEDS AND THE GOZ'S ABILITY TO SUPPORT ADDITIONAL DEBT BURDENS. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, NOTABLY THE SHABA INVASION, HAVE SERVED TO INVOLVE BELGIUM AND FRANCE MORE DEEPLY THAN BEFORE IN MEETING ZAIRE'S SECURITY NEEDS. THIS TREND SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED, BUT AT THE SAME TIME WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT THOSE COUNTRIES CANNOT CARRY THE ENTIRE BURDEN. INDEED, THEIR WILLINGNESS TO DO MORE MAY DEPEND IN PART ON BEING ASSURED THAT THE US WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY A ROLE TOO.

33. THE SHABA INVASION SEEMS TO HAVE HAD A SOBERING AND,

HOPEFULLY, SALUTARY EFFECT ON MOBUTU'S PERCEPTION OF THE STATE OF HIS ARMY AND ITS NEED FOR THOROUGH REORGANIZATION AND TRAINING AND EQUIPPING AT LEVELS MORE BASIC THAN HERETOFORE ENVISAGED. MOBUTU HAS ALREADY TAKEN THE FIRST STEPS IN THIS PROCESS OF REFORM WHICH, IF PURSUED, WHOULD FACILITATE BETTER USE OF EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES PROVIDED UNDER OUR FMS AND IMET PROGRAMS. WHILE THE PREVIOUSLY-PLANNED FORCE UPGRADE PACKAGE SHOULD BE KEPT ON THE SHELF FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE IMPLEMENTATION, THE GOZ-S DECISION TO USE FY 77 AND 78 CREDITS FOR LESS SOPHISTICATED, MORE URGENTLY NEEDED EQUIPMENT IN THE TRADITIONAL AREAS OF TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC., IS A WELCOME INDICATION THAT THE GOZ IS NOW FOCUSING ITS SIGHTS ON MORE REALISTIC, RATIONAL GOALS. WE ANTICIPATE, AND SHOULD ENCOURAGE AND FACILITATE, SIMILAR USE OF FY 79 CREDITS AS WELL.

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